Why Israel’s Next Red Sea Partner May Be a Country Without a Coast

Negotiated Ethiopian access to Assab could connect Israel’s maritime security interests with Ethiopia’s economic ambitions.

By Ermias Assefa ·

Israel-Ethiopia Relations

A port is only as useful as the shipping lanes that reach it. Israel’s experience at Eilat has made that lesson expensive. Between January and July 2026, the port received approximately 21,000 vehicles, compared with roughly 111,000 during the same period in 2023. The disruption caused by Houthi attacks has exposed the vulnerability of Israel’s southern gateway to global trade.

One country deserves a larger place in Israel’s response: Ethiopia. If Addis Ababa secures durable access to the Eritrean port of Assab through negotiation, a deeper partnership could give Israel an additional regional partner with a powerful economic reason to help keep the Red Sea open.

The terms matter. Assab belongs to Eritrea, and the breakdown in diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea in October makes any agreement a difficult prospect. A viable arrangement would require Eritrean consent, tangible benefits for both neighbors and clearly defined commercial and security rights. An outlet obtained through war would undermine the stability that makes the proposal attractive in the first place.

The case begins with trade

Ethiopia already has a substantial interest in secure shipping. More than 95% of its import and export trade by volume passes through the Djibouti corridor, according to TradeMark Africa. Such dependence leaves the country’s access to global markets heavily concentrated along a single route.

An agreement at Assab could diversify that access and give Ethiopia a more direct operational role in maritime commerce. Infrastructure, a lasting commercial presence and agreed security cooperation could turn an existing economic interest into a practical contribution to regional stability.

For Israel, the attraction is the combination of Ethiopia’s large potential market, its dependence on international trade and an established bilateral relationship. President Isaac Herzog’s February 2026 visit to Addis Ababa included discussions of technology, agriculture and security. A maritime partnership would give that relationship a more concrete strategic purpose.

What a maritime partnership could deliver

The security case should begin with functions a partnership could realistically develop: vessel monitoring, intelligence sharing, port protection and logistics. Israeli support for training and surveillance could help Ethiopia contribute to a broader effort to protect commercial traffic.

More ambitious responsibilities, including patrols and coordinated maritime enforcement, would require vessels, trained personnel, sustained funding and explicit operating agreements. Commercial access alone supplies none of these. A useful partnership would have to build them.

That distinction matters because a presence on the African shore would not, by itself, neutralize attacks launched from Yemen. Shipowners and insurers would still need evidence that voyages were sufficiently safe. The relevant question is whether cooperation could improve warning, preparedness and protection at a cost the partners can sustain.

Ethiopia’s potential contribution lies in adding another substantial regional participant whose commercial interests favor predictable shipping. Israel should judge the proposal by the capabilities it could produce and the stability it could support.

Giving the partnership an economic foundation

Eilat offers a commercial starting point. The port already handles potash exports from the Dead Sea, while Israel’s agricultural cooperation with Ethiopia through MASHAV provides an established foundation for expanding trade in agricultural technology and equipment. Fertilizer, irrigation systems and related machinery are plausible areas for a stronger commercial relationship.

A functioning Ethiopian corridor through Assab could broaden Eilat’s market and give businesses in both countries another route for trade. But the corridor would have to earn its traffic. Competitive freight rates, reliable inland transport, efficient customs procedures and committed buyers would determine whether the opportunity becomes a regular shipping business.

Those requirements strengthen the case for a carefully structured agreement. A corridor supported by actual cargo and dependable revenues would give businesses and governments a continuing reason to preserve it. The commercial arrangements would help sustain the strategic relationship.

Energy adds another dimension. The bidirectional Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline connects the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, providing a route for crude oil that bypasses the Suez Canal. Safer access to Eilat would increase the value of that alternative, although its usefulness would still depend on operating conditions, commercial arrangements and the security of the infrastructure itself.

The diplomatic benefits could extend further. Addis Ababa hosts the African Union and is an important setting for continental diplomacy. A partnership that delivers visible gains in trade, agriculture and infrastructure could give Israel a stronger basis for engagement in Africa.

A bargain worth pursuing

The hardest part of this proposal is securing an agreement that the countries involved would have reason to sustain. Eritrea would need commercial returns and credible security assurances. Ethiopia would need dependable access to global markets. Israel would need practical cooperation that improves the resilience of its southern trade routes.

That is a demanding diplomatic undertaking. It nevertheless gives Israel a concrete reason to support negotiations and, if an agreement emerges, the infrastructure and security cooperation needed to make it work.

Ethiopia needs a reliable route to the sea. Israel needs reliable passage through it. A negotiated arrangement at Assab could turn those parallel needs into a durable partnership.